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Middle East

The new joint venture aims to support seabed intervention projects worldwide. (Image Credit: Adobe Stock)

Enshore Subsea acquired by Al Gihaz Holding

  • Region: Middle East
  • Date: Apr, 2021

AdobeStock 64589851

Al Gihaz Contracting, part of Al Gihaz Holding, has announced its acquisition of assets, intellectual property and the management systems of Enshore Subsea, a UK-based subsea trenching company, providing seabed intervention services to major projects across industries around the world.

The acquisition will see the creation of a new joint venture with the aim of forming a leading seabed intervention and construction management services provider. The joint venture will rely on the acquired specialised assets of the company, the skilled team and the company’s successful track record of completed projects to aid the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s drive to generate 58.7GW of clean energy by 2030 as part of the Saudi Vision 2030.

Sami Alangari, Group Vice Chairman of Al Gihaz Holding commented, “With this acquisition, Enshore Subsea will benefit from the technical and financial expertise of Al Gihaz Contracting, which for many years has been a leading power and manufacturing services provider locally and internationally. We will be able to provide competitive, resilient and diverse services to cover projects globally, and in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This investment is in line with the Vision 2030 of the Kingdom and will pave the way for a strong involvement of the Group in this field.”

Enshore Subsea

Enshore Subsea will be based out of the existing operational facility in the port of Blyth in the UK, which is supported by a skills base that facilitates the supply of services into the global offshore seabed intervention market. Services will include subsea engineering and construction management, skilled manpower supply and equipment rental for subsea trenching, seabed intervention, development of seabed tooling technology and submarine flexible product installation. The expertise of the existing management and operational teams from Enshore Subsea will remain with the joint venture.

Pierre Boyde, Managing Director of Enshore Subsea, said, “I am delighted that through this cooperation with Al Gihaz, we are able to take the company forward with a sustainable cost base, renewed energy and focus on our areas of expertise. We aim to be the Contractor’s contractor of choice, supporting seabed intervention projects worldwide.”

Left to Right – Jim Thomson, CEO of Wellpro Group and Brian Garden, Managing Director of Omega Well Intervention. (Image Credit: Omega Well Intervention)

Omega Well Intervention and Wellpro Group enhance influence in the MENA region through strategic alliance

  • Region: Middle East
  • Date: Mar, 2021

Omega Wellpro Press Release Photo Final

Downhole technology developer and manufacturer Omega Well Intervention and well intervention company Wellpro Group, have announced a strategic alliance to deliver downhole tools to the Middle East and North African (MENA) market.

As per the agreement, Wellpro Group will manage the deployment of Omega Well Intervention products through their extensive network across the region, a move which will go alongside significant investment in all MENA facilities. Omega Well Intervention will provide access to an engineering design team as well as manufacturing capabilities and test facilities for product development.

Jim Thomson, CEO of Wellpro Group commented, “This agreement, which covers the Middle East and North Africa, gives us the opportunity to deliver a more complete well intervention package to the region. In these challenging times, our clients are increasingly looking for ways to reduce costs and make operational efficiencies. Through this alliance we are now able to offer them a wider range of products from a single source.”

Brian Garden, Managing Director of Omega Well Intervention, added, “As part of Omega growth strategy, collaboration with Wellpro Group within the Middle East enhances the ability of both companies to offer a more comprehensive product range within the well intervention business space. This collaboration will ensure that we deliver quality products alongside first-class service.”

This agreement comes as part of Wellpro Group’s clear intentions to strengthen their presence in the Middle East region, quickly following the company announcement (in December 2020) that it was entering the Saudi Arabian oil and gas market with the energy services company i-Energy involving complete operational asset and field support.

For Omega Well Intervention it is another step in a successful spell which has recently seen the award of two accreditations by the American Petroleum Institute for its retrievable bridge plugs and quality management system adding to the twenty five patents across their range of downhole tools that the company already boasts.

Middle East Well Integrity Whitepaper

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics, Integrity
  • Date: Feb, 2017

There are different definitions of Well Integrity. The most widely accepted definition is given by NORSOK D-010:

“Application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of a well”.

Another accepted definition is given by ISO TS 16530-2:

“Containment and the prevention of the escape of fluids (i.e. liquids or gases) to subterranean formations or surface’’.

Well Integrity is undoubtedly a multidisciplinary approach. Therefore, well integrity engineers need to interact constantly with different disciplines (e.g. well intervention and drilling) to assess the status of well barriers and well barrier envelopes at all times.


 

Download Attachments: Download PDF

Aging Well Stock Management in the Middle East

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics, Integrity
  • Date: Feb, 2017

Introduction

The Middle East offshore market generally has shallow water depth operations in high salinity water environments. As fields in the Arabia Peninsula mature and production declines they need extensive recovery enhancement and workovers which place added stress on the asset. In conjunction with the age and salinity of the water these works can effect the structural integrity of aging wells. This forces further works to take place, including diagnostic runs and tubing remediation.

In the Middle East companies including Saudi Aramco, QP, Zadco and ADMA-OPCO have become experts in dealing with mature offshore wellstock, and below is a case study from the region highlighting the best practice that has been learnt.

Middle East Experience of Aging Well Stock Management

With a global slowing of drilling activities, we are often finding ourselves working over mature fields with old well stock to encourage greater recovery volumes and meet the demand for hydrocarbons. Mature assets have unpredictable behaviors, and this demands highly skilled teams and well thought out intervention activities to ensure the continued production of these assets. >Case One: The Well

In one example the Middle East operator observed live wells having fluid mobility into annulus space, resulting in the bleeding of hydrocarbons at the surface. The Annulus-B pressures were reaching 1000psi, and there was clear evidence of communication within casings. The hydro-testing of annulus space showed the wells were unable to withstand the test pressures, so ultrasonic testing, cement bond logging, and other logging techniques were used to quantify the integrity and accurately identify leak paths ahead of restoring the well integrity of failed Annulus-B wells. It was decided to repair the conductor pipe and perform casing patches externally and internally and cement consolidated rock formations, then cover with a tie back. As a remediation strategy, a cement barrier was placed in production casing above the reservoir using sleeves, patches, perforating two-zone techniques and milling to mention a few.

The utilization of section milling as a remediation measure is interesting. Its effectiveness was later verified with cement bond logging to ensure that integrity was assured. The operational challenge faced from leveraging milling technology was a failure to pass the bottom of section mill cut. This was then solved by using a taper mill to drill the required section.

The root cause of the integrity issues were understood to be generic aging (the wells were approximately thirty-years old), poor cement jobs and the possibility of ineffective drilling practices used at the initial stages of the well’s life. The core objective was to restore to well integrity of production and injection wells and rule out well abandonment as an option. This was achieved and the programme was a success – resulting in the extension of the mature asset’s life.

Case Two: The Conductor

In this case the operator discusses two fields in the Arabian Peninsula, one consisting of 99 wellhead towers, and the other having 116 wellheads towers – cumulatively the integrity department is having to manage 217 wellhead towers. The technical challenge faced by the operator is that over 60% of these wellheads towers are in life extension phase.

If offshore conductors corrode to the point their structural integrity fails, they are bound to buckle leading X-mas tree and other related critical equipment to fail.

The wellhead towers are typically 3-legged and 4-legged (with 9 slots) having above water guide support and near seabed conductor support. One of the main issues the operator is facing is having 9 slots conductor’s exposure to the huge amount of wave load which may transfer through conductor guides followed by jackets to piles. It is important to highlight conductor guides support for the wellhead towers is necessary, otherwise, the conductor will be free standing and may subject to vortex induced vibrations which could fail under free vibration or due to fatigue.

When designing conductor supports it is essential that the weight from X-mass tree, BOP, lateral support, vortex induced vibration, corrosion protection and marine growth should be considered among other requirements with respecting code and standards established by NORSOK, API, and ISO.

In the region operators have typical well conductor loading depth varying from 100ft to 300ft, having two types of loadings axial compression and global bending. The operational integrity is assured by conducting scheduled screen inspection (visual inspection) followed by detailed inspection using Saturated Low-Frequency Eddy Current (SLOFEC) and Pulsed Eddy Current (PEC) quantifying the minimum wall thickness, external and internal detections, separate mapping and other techniques.

By executing these inspections and then coupling them quickly with remedial works, abnormalities in the aging conductor were identified and rectified within the scheduled inspection window. In one example it was discovered there was at least a minimum wall thickness and therefore efficient strength to assure the stability of the asset against atmospheric, splash and full submerged segments of the conductor – and therefore its ability to cope with the stress of a work over for production enhancement applications was established.

The results of applying this conductor programme across the two fields showed that a robust remedial strategy, as emphasized by this operator, reduced rig intervention for replacement and fewer rig repair strategies such as reinforced cement, bolted clamps and welded sleeves just to mention a few.

Conclusion

Well integrity is becoming increasingly important in maturing fields in the Middle East. The asset integrity lifecycle is ever evolving, and lessons learned must be added to our codes of practice and become ‘the norm’ for future projects. This will ensure that collectively we are able to continue the efficient production from our existing assets for the benefit of future generations.

The insights captured in this document are indicative of a culture where we need a continuous improvement across training our personnel to increase competency, safety and cost-effectiveness of operations and use innovative approaches in low price environment.

From these examples, a scheduled approach to preventative maintenance workovers are shown to be more cost-effective overtime rather than dealing with sever and critical integrity works which are bound to follow.

Sustained Casing Pressure (SCP): Defining if a Scenario Needs Intervention

Sustained Casing Pressure (SCP): Defining if a Scenario Needs Intervention

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics, Integrity
  • Date: Jun, 2019

Sustained Casing Pressure (SCP): Defining if a Scenario Needs Intervention

In this second part of my article series on SCP, I will discuss how to define whether you have an SCP scenario that needs intervention or not. In the first article in this series, I talked about a framework from which we can deal with the problems related to SCP. I also gave an overview of which guidelines from different industry bodies that address this topic.

Following the advice given by these guidelines and listening to what operators in the Middle East are telling us, I suggest you look into four aspects of your well annulus behaviour to define whether you have an SCP scenario that needs intervention or not:

Leak nature
Leak rate
Annulus pressure
In a less conventional manner; hydrocarbon gas mass.


LEAK NATURE

There may be a risk of introduction of toxic material such as H2S or radioactive agents into the annuli through the SCP. Such materials imply a considerable risk to personnel safety, and their presence, no matter the other parameters, indicate that the leak needs to be remediated.

LEAK RATE

Excessive leak rates increase the consequences if containment is lost. The magnitude of the leak will dictate the operator’s ability to normalize the situation since it defines the amount of energy released, its impact on the affected area, and in general, the leak escalation potential. So while a significant leak needs immediate attention, there is a value at which it doesn’t.

API RP 14B states acceptance criteria for leakage rate through a closed subsurface safety valve system, and although the norm is not directly applicable for SCP, its reasoning may still be regarded as an appropriate analogy for determining acceptance criteria for SCP. OGN117 use it as its acceptance criteria for annulus leaks.

The acceptance criteria for leak rate, when hydrocarbons are present in the source of influx, are:

15 scf/min (0.42m3/min) for gas
0.4 liter/min for liquid


ANNULUS PRESSURE

What sounds like a reasonable and empiric statement anywhere you hear it is that the pressure in the annulus should never reach the maximum allowable annulus surface pressure at the wellhead (MAASP). However, in this regard, OGN 117 only advise operators to take into consideration all aspects that detrimentally affect the normal rating of the wellbore hardware when setting the MAASP.

Instead, API-90 (Offshore wells) goes into detail on how to establish an acceptable level of risk for annular casing pressure, using two parameters.

First, sustained annular casing pressure that is greater than 100 psig must bleed to zero psig. If it does, it indicates that the leak rate is small and the barriers to flow are still effective. Second, a procedure is offered to calculate a Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating Pressure (MAWOP) which sums up to:

MAWOP is based on Minimum Internal Yield Pressure (MIYP) of both tubulars (the one being evaluated and the next outer one) as well as the Minimum Collapse Pressure (MCP) for the inner tubular which are calculated according to API Bulletin 5C3.

MAWOP for an annulus is expected to be less than the following:

50% of the Minimum Internal Yield Pressure (MIYP) of casing string being evaluated; or
80% of the MIYP of the next outer casing; or
75% of the Minimum Collapse Pressure of the inner tubular pipe body o In case of the outer most pressure containing casing, the MAWOP can’t exceed 30% of its MIYP
If there is pressure communication between two or more outer casing annuli (e.g., communication between the “B” and “C” annuli or between the “C” and “D” annuli, etc.), then the casing separating these annuli is not considered a competent barrier and should not be used in the MAWOP calculation.


Figure 3 shows an example of MAWOP calculations, note the MAWOP is controlled by MIYP of the next outer casing for the “B” annulus, while the MIYP pressure of the casing being evaluated dictates the MAWOP of the annulus “A” and “C”. Finally, annulus “D” MWAOP is set by the MYIP of the outer most casing rule.

SCP-Table-1024x417

Figure 3. Example of MAWOP calculations for a well with no communication between annuli as per API-90.


Finally, API-90-2 incorporated two alternative cases with a slight deviation in the MAWOP calculations. The first one, called the “Default Designation Method” (DDM), does not require data or analysis to be applied. It can be used in a vast majority of onshore wells where poor data is available. It’s the least precise of the methods, and it’s appropriate for wells that operate at low levels of annular pressure. In the DDM, the MAWOP for the annulus being evaluated is 100 psi (700 kPa) for the outermost annulus, and 200 psi (1400 kPa) for all other annuli, and it requires no further calculations.

If a casing string has significant drill string wear, suspected or known erosion or corrosion, or is operating under high temperature, API-90-2 suggest a second deviation to API-90 for the calculation of MAWOP. This is called “Explicit De-rating Method” (EDM); in this alternative method, the operator would apply a specific reduction in the wall thickness or material properties in calculating the MIYP and MCP.

Using the EDM approach for the inner and outer tubulars, the tubular de-rating component of MAWOP for the annulus being evaluated is the minimum of one of the following:

80 % of the adjusted MIYP of the outer tubular string
80 % of the adjusted MCP of the inner tubular string
100 % of the adjusted MIYP of the next outer tubular string (provides an additional factor of safety)
100 % of the adjusted MCP of the outer tubular string, (i.e., the inner tubular of the next outer adjacent annulus)


The MIYP and the MCP for the tubing and casing strings can be calculated per API 5C3, but their adjusted values are calculated by the following:

MIYPAdj = [(MIYP ⋅ UFb) – ΔPwcd] and MCPAdj = [(MCP ⋅ UFc) – ΔPwcd]

Where MIYP and MCP are the minimum internal yield and collapse pressures; UFb and UFc are the burst and collapse utilization factors (1.0 equals 100 %); ΔPwcd is the pressure differential from the inside to the outside of the casing at worst case depth (i.e., the depth that yields the maximum ΔP). There is no industry standard for the utilization factors, and operators would choose them as part of their safety factors assumptions.


HYDROCARBON GAS MASS

An aspect often overlooked in the Middle East, and not covered by API, but well defined in the Norwegian sector of the North-Sea, is the mass of gas which will result in limited consequences and as low as reasonably practicable probability of escalation if released (OGN 117). Although not directly applicable to SCP, NORSOK S-001 Technical Safety contains an analog requirement to determine acceptance criteria for hydrocarbon gas mass:

“…For pressure vessels and piping segments without a depressurizing system, containing gas or unstabilized oil with high gas/oil-ratio, the maximum containment should be considerably lower than 1000kg…”

This item is typically ignored in the Gulf region as all tubulars have cement to surface either as part of their primary cement jobs or as a result of top-up jobs done afterward. So typically, the SCP leak paths are through cracks/channels in the cement sheet and/or micro-annuli between the cement and the casings. Therefore, the mass of hydrocarbon in the annulus tends to be below any known pre-set criteria. However, for those of you out there trying to come up with a set of criteria for your wells, this is an item worth keeping in mind.

We’ll leave it here for now, next articles will be around how to characterize the SCP to establish when an intervention is required, choosing the ideal solution and how to evaluate the success of any potential treatment.

MIGUEL DIAZ

Miguel has 20 years’ experience from operations, technical advisor, quality assurance, business development and management positions in the oil & gas industry from all areas of the high-pressure pumping services. He has worked in South America, the Caribbean Sea, central and eastern Europe, Sub-Sahara Africa and the middle east. Miguel serves as one of our cementing experts and is our Regional Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region.

Free Guide The most common causes for leaks in oil wells and 8 questions to consider before you select solution

Implementing Well Intervention Technology

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics
  • Date: Aug, 2019

Implementing Well Intervention Technology

Access an exclusive podcast with Saudi Aramco, Baker Hughes and NOV exploring the most effective strategies to implement new well intervention technologies. Hear the essential information Middle East operators need to ensure technology is successfully implemented and contract/tendering times are kept to a minimum.

Questions explored include:

What are the key challenges service providers face when trying to implement new technology for well intervention and how can operators help?
What are the key requirements operators need from service providers to ensure tendering time is kept to a minimum?
How does the increasing use of TOTEX (CAPEX+OPEX) evaluation during procurement enable the uptake in new technology adoption?

MENA Well Intervention Technology

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics
  • Date: Jul, 2019

In this second part of my article series on SCP, I will discuss how to define whether you have an SCP scenario that needs intervention or not. In the first article in this series, I talked about a framework from which we can deal with the problems related to SCP. I also gave an overview of which guidelines from different industry bodies that address this topic.

Following the advice given by these guidelines and listening to what operators in the Middle East are telling us, I suggest you look into four aspects of your well annulus behaviour to define whether you have an SCP scenario that needs intervention or not:

Leak nature
Leak rate
Annulus pressure
In a less conventional manner; hydrocarbon gas mass.


LEAK NATURE


There may be a risk of introduction of toxic material such as H2S or radioactive agents into the annuli through the SCP. Such materials imply a considerable risk to personnel safety, and their presence, no matter the other parameters, indicate that the leak needs to be remediated.

LEAK RATE


Excessive leak rates increase the consequences if containment is lost. The magnitude of the leak will dictate the operator’s ability to normalize the situation since it defines the amount of energy released, its impact on the affected area, and in general, the leak escalation potential. So while a significant leak needs immediate attention, there is a value at which it doesn’t.

API RP 14B states acceptance criteria for leakage rate through a closed subsurface safety valve system, and although the norm is not directly applicable for SCP, its reasoning may still be regarded as an appropriate analogy for determining acceptance criteria for SCP. OGN117 use it as its acceptance criteria for annulus leaks.

The acceptance criteria for leak rate, when hydrocarbons are present in the source of influx, are:

15 scf/min (0.42m3/min) for gas
0.4 liter/min for liquid


ANNULUS PRESSURE

What sounds like a reasonable and empiric statement anywhere you hear it is that the pressure in the annulus should never reach the maximum allowable annulus surface pressure at the wellhead (MAASP). However, in this regard, OGN 117 only advise operators to take into consideration all aspects that detrimentally affect the normal rating of the wellbore hardware when setting the MAASP.

Instead, API-90 (Offshore wells) goes into detail on how to establish an acceptable level of risk for annular casing pressure, using two parameters.

First, sustained annular casing pressure that is greater than 100 psig must bleed to zero psig. If it does, it indicates that the leak rate is small and the barriers to flow are still effective. Second, a procedure is offered to calculate a Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating Pressure (MAWOP) which sums up to:

MAWOP is based on Minimum Internal Yield Pressure (MIYP) of both tubulars (the one being evaluated and the next outer one) as well as the Minimum Collapse Pressure (MCP) for the inner tubular which are calculated according to API Bulletin 5C3.

MAWOP for an annulus is expected to be less than the following:

50% of the Minimum Internal Yield Pressure (MIYP) of casing string being evaluated; or
80% of the MIYP of the next outer casing; or
75% of the Minimum Collapse Pressure of the inner tubular pipe body o In case of the outer most pressure containing casing, the MAWOP can’t exceed
30% of its MIYP

If there is pressure communication between two or more outer casing annuli (e.g., communication between the “B” and “C” annuli or between the “C” and “D” annuli, etc.), then the casing separating these annuli is not considered a competent barrier and should not be used in the MAWOP calculation.

Figure 3 shows an example of MAWOP calculations, note the MAWOP is controlled by MIYP of the next outer casing for the “B” annulus, while the MIYP pressure of the casing being evaluated dictates the MAWOP of the annulus “A” and “C”. Finally, annulus “D” MWAOP is set by the MYIP of the outer most casing rule.

Figure 3. Example of MAWOP calculations for a well with no communication between annuli as per API-90.

Finally, API-90-2 incorporated two alternative cases with a slight deviation in the MAWOP calculations. The first one, called the “Default Designation Method” (DDM), does not require data or analysis to be applied. It can be used in a vast majority of onshore wells where poor data is available. It’s the least precise of the methods, and it’s appropriate for wells that operate at low levels of annular pressure. In the DDM, the MAWOP for the annulus being evaluated is 100 psi (700 kPa) for the outermost annulus, and 200 psi (1400 kPa) for all other annuli, and it requires no further calculations.

If a casing string has significant drill string wear, suspected or known erosion or corrosion, or is operating under high temperature, API-90-2 suggest a second deviation to API-90 for the calculation of MAWOP. This is called “Explicit De-rating Method” (EDM); in this alternative method, the operator would apply a specific reduction in the wall thickness or material properties in calculating the MIYP and MCP.

Using the EDM approach for the inner and outer tubulars, the tubular de-rating component of MAWOP for the annulus being evaluated is the minimum of one of the following:

80 % of the adjusted MIYP of the outer tubular string
80 % of the adjusted MCP of the inner tubular string
100 % of the adjusted MIYP of the next outer tubular string (provides an additional factor of safety)
100 % of the adjusted MCP of the outer tubular string, (i.e., the inner tubular of the next outer adjacent annulus)

The MIYP and the MCP for the tubing and casing strings can be calculated per API 5C3, but their adjusted values are calculated by the following:

MIYPAdj = [(MIYP ⋅ UFb) – ΔPwcd] and MCPAdj = [(MCP ⋅ UFc) – ΔPwcd]

Where MIYP and MCP are the minimum internal yield and collapse pressures; UFb and UFc are the burst and collapse utilization factors (1.0 equals 100 %); ΔPwcd is the pressure differential from the inside to the outside of the casing at worst case depth (i.e., the depth that yields the maximum ΔP). There is no industry standard for the utilization factors, and operators would choose them as part of their safety factors assumptions.

HYDROCARBON GAS MASS

An aspect often overlooked in the Middle East, and not covered by API, but well defined in the Norwegian sector of the North-Sea, is the mass of gas which will result in limited consequences and as low as reasonably practicable probability of escalation if released (OGN 117). Although not directly applicable to SCP, NORSOK S-001 Technical Safety contains an analog requirement to determine acceptance criteria for hydrocarbon gas mass:

“…For pressure vessels and piping segments without a depressurizing system, containing gas or unstabilized oil with high gas/oil-ratio, the maximum containment should be considerably lower than 1000kg…”

This item is typically ignored in the Gulf region as all tubulars have cement to surface either as part of their primary cement jobs or as a result of top-up jobs done afterward. So typically, the SCP leak paths are through cracks/channels in the cement sheet and/or micro-annuli between the cement and the casings. Therefore, the mass of hydrocarbon in the annulus tends to be below any known pre-set criteria. However, for those of you out there trying to come up with a set of criteria for your wells, this is an item worth keeping in mind.

We’ll leave it here for now, next articles will be around how to characterize the SCP to establish when an intervention is required, choosing the ideal solution and how to evaluate the success of any potential treatment.

MIGUEL DIAZ

Miguel has 20 years’ experience from operations, technical advisor, quality assurance, business development and management positions in the oil & gas industry from all areas of the high-pressure pumping services. He has worked in South America, the Caribbean Sea, central and eastern Europe, Sub-Sahara Africa and the middle east. Miguel serves as one of our cementing experts and is our Regional Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region.

Free Guide The most common causes for leaks in oil wells and 8 questions to consider before you select solution

 

Plug and Abandonment: Coiled Tubing

Unpublished
  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics, Decommissioning
  • Date: Feb, 2018

Here we are, at last, with the final piece of our series on Plug and abandonment of oil and gas wells. We went through legislation and design, guidelines and best practices, materials and the PWC® innovative placement methods. Today we will go through a very particular P&A deployment method: Coiled Tubing (CT).

Flapper Valve Milling Inspection

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics
  • Date: Jan, 2017

Flapper Valve Milling Inspection

This Video of the Month is from a well in the Middle East. The operator utilized EV’s Optis™ HD Memory camera to inspect the flow tube and flapper valve condition of a surface-controlled safety valve. Earlier intervention work had resulted in the need to fish tools at the valve but now the functionality of the valve was in question. There was communication across the valve but not access through it.

EV’s HD memory camera was deployed on slickline and here we find the actuated flow tube shifting up and down properly while the camera is stationary. The operator prepped the well by pumping clear water and shutting the well in to allow a gas phase to build at this shallow depth from the surface. On the same camera run but one meter deeper is the flapper valve which should open as the flow tube is cycled. However, the flapper is jammed in a partly open position allowing fluid to pass by but not equipment.

The operator decided to mill through the flapper with a hydraulic workover unit and requested EV’s HD memory camera to check milling progress if there were issues. The flapper valve was successful milled through but a subsequent gauge run stacked out 32m below the valve. The camera was deployed to inspect the milled area of the safety valve and the cause of the deeper obstruction. The video shows a very clean milling job in the flapper area with no potential hazards to hang up tools. 32m deeper we find part of the milled flapper has fallen and is now stuck across the well bore. The operator elected to install a temporary safety valve and return the well to production and will attempt to recover the fish at a later date.

INSPECTION OF JET PUMP HOUSING

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics
  • Date: Sep, 2019

INSPECTION OF JET PUMP HOUSING

This video of the month showcases how the application of CorrosionVA, supported by Integrated Video Caliper technology, helped an operator in Tunisia overcome a well integrity issue and maintain the safe operation of one of their high-rate production wells.

Wells operate under extreme conditions, involving exposure to challenging temperatures and pressures for extended periods of time.

Slickline Camera for Safety Profile Inspection & Parted tubing

  • Region: Middle East
  • Topics: All Topics
  • Date: Feb, 2017

Slickline Camera for Safety Profile Inspection & Parted tubing

This Video of the Month is from a well in the Middle East. The operator utilized EV’s Optis™ HD Memory camera to inspect the flow tube and flapper valve condition of a surface-controlled safety valve. Earlier intervention work had resulted in the need to fish tools at the valve but now the functionality of the valve was in question. There was communication across the valve but there was no access through it.

First, the operator decided to run a Lead Impression Block, which returned to surface with a half-moon shape impression. After seeing the impression, the Operator was not satisfied the results were conclusive and wanted a visual answer to identify what the obstruction was down hole.

EV were called in as an urgent service to give a clear answer. EV’s Optis™ HD colour memory camera capable of capturing 30 frames per second for up to 4 hours was deployed on Slickline to investigate. Once the camera program had completed, tools were pulled out of hole, footage was quickly downloaded and all soon became apparent.

The video shows the tubing had parted just below the DHSV. The camera exits the upper section of parted tubing and continues to run in. 4m below, the lower section of the parting can be seen, answering the half-moon shape on the LIB. With the assistance of the collapsible bowspring centralizers, the 1 11/16” OD toolstring was able to re-enter the lower section of tubing and continued to run in a further few meters.

While Pulling out of hole the camera exits the lower section of parting and re-enters the upper section of tubing capturing the DHSV components found to be in good condition.

The quick reaction from call-out to wellsite for EV to run EV their Optis™ Memory Camera allowed a definitive answer to the problem downhole in a matter of hours, saving the operator vital time & cost from making further unnecessary runs in hole, instead allowing them to plan ahead for the problem at hand.

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